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Abstract:  In this paper, The Applications of Utility Theory in insurance industry are 
discussed from two ways.First of all we consider the insurance pricing from both 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The insurance pricing is always the core of insurance business. Although the price pattern is commonly 
fixed by “pure insurance premium and attachment insurance premium” in insurance practice and books , 
theoretically speaking, the insurance product is the same as other commodity. Its price is essentially 
decidied by the market supply-demand relation. What is particularly is that it is not to fix price for the 
visible product merely, but to invisible “risk”. Here the risk can be understanded as the adjustment or the 
loss random variable(S.M.Ross. 2005). As the matter stands, the insurance pricing in formally is to 
establish one kind of price measures, which is possible to use one kind of precise quantity (insurance 
premium) to weigh an indefinite loss. So we discuss the insurance pricing question from the economic 
utility theory in this paper. 
 
2.  DISCUSSING INSURANCE PRICING SEPARATELY FROM INSURER 
AND ISURED'S ANGLE(QIN GUI-XIA.2008) 
 
First, we analyse the insurance pricing from the insurer and insured's value structure separately. Suppose 
somebody has the property valuing w , but this property faces some kind of latent loss, which is 
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expressed as a random variable X , wX ≤≤0 .The probability distribution records is )(xF .Our 
question is how many insurance premiums he have to take out  for this insurance? According to Utility 
theory (WANG, JIANG & LIU. 2003), the fewer the insurance premium H  is, the better for the insured  
The highest insurance premium is the solution when “insurance effectiveness” was equal to “insurance 
effectiveness not to take out”.  
If the insured is willing to take out insurance, he only loses the insurance premium whether the loses 
occur or not. And the insured still has Hw − , supposes its effectiveness for the insured is  
)( Hwu − ;If the insured does not take out insurance, in fact its property is the random variable Xw − , 
we record the effectiveness of this random variable as [ ])( XwU − . Therefore, to the property owner, 
the insurance premium should satisfy: 
[ ])-()( XwUHwu ≥−  
H bigger, Hw − is smaller, and insurance effectiveness )( Hwu −  is also smaller. When the 
equal sign is established, it does not matter whether to participate or not . The highest insurance premium 
*H  which can be accepted by the insured is the solution when the equation equal sign is established. 
In another inspect, considering from insurer's angle, if insuring, the insurer may increase an 
insurance premium income G  in original wealth foundation v , but undertake the risk for the insured. 
Its wealth becomes the random variable XGv −+ . How many insurance premiums should the insurer 
charge to insure the property owner's risk?  Similarly, the higher G  is, the better is to the insurer. 
Suppose the insurer records the determination quantity and random variable effectiveness for 1u  and 
1U  separately .Then the reasonable premiums should satisfy the following effectiveness inequality:  
[ ] )()X-Gv( 11 vuU ≥+  
The smaller G  is, the smaller [ ])X-Gv(1 +U is, When the equal sign establishes, the insurance 
has not any attraction. Therefore the insurer is willing to accept the lowest insurance premium *G *G  
which can be accepted by the insurer. And G is the solution when the equation equal sign establishes. 
Therefore, only the highest insurance premium *H  which the insurer is willing to pay is more than 
the lowest insurance premium *G which the insurer is willing to accept , could a reasonable insurance 
contract be situated between *H  and *G  . Figure 1 shows the relations among critical insurance 
premium *H , *G and pure insurance premium [ ]XE  as well as actual price P .  
By Utility Theory, most people hate the risk. By the Jensen inequality (XIE, HAN. 2000), the 
loathing risk's policy holder is willing to pay higher insurance premium to take out insurance, 
namely [ ]XEH >* . If ** GH < , it is unable to finalize a deal.                                     
      
0 [ ]XE *G *H
P
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Figure 1 [ ]XE ， *H , *G and P  
 The following is a famous gambling example using the utility function to fix the safe product price. 
Although it is not a direct safe policy-making question, it contains the same essence. 
St. Petersburg paradox (GUO.2004) There is a fable that one kind of gambling is popular in the St. 
Petersburg in the past street corner. The rule is all participant prepaid certain number money, for instance 
100 rubles, then threw the cent, the gambling was terminated when the person surface dynasty presented 
first time; If the person surface dynasty did not present until the n  talent, the participant took back n2  
rubles. The question is that whether the policymaker take part in the gambling 
Suppose the cent is even. The probability that the person surface dynasty does not present until the n  
talent is nnp −= 2)( .The corresponding repayment value is 1002 −n , ...3,2,1=n .Therefore, the 
average repayment of “participating the gambling” is +∞=−= −
∞
=
∑ n
n
nE 2)1002(
1
, but the average 
repayment of “ not participating the gambling” is obviously 0.It looks like that the policymaker can win 
(on average) “the infinite many rubles” by spending 100 rubles. It seems that participating the gambling 
is absolutely worthwhile. But the actual situation was contrary; extremely few can take back 100 rubles 
above situations. 
In fact, according to utility theory, what we should consider is the Utility function )( nxu of  
policymaker , not the amount value nx  itself, and policymaker's wealth level ( recorded as w ) will also 
affect his effectiveness. Generally, suppose the policy-maker is willing to pay the price p to attend this 
game, recorded as pwx nn −+= 2 , by now, the probability of “participating in the gambling” is 
still nnxp
−= 2)( , 1002 −+= nn wx , ,...2,1=n  the expected utility value of  “participating in the 
gambling” is  ∑∞
=
=
1
)()(
n
nn xpxuEU =
n
n
n pwu −
∞
=
×−+∑ 2)2(
1
. 
Generally speaking, the most policy-makers are loathe the risk, only when it could bring bigger 
utility than expected, the policymaker is willing to take part in the gambling. Namely:  
n
n
n pwuwu −
∞
=
×−+≤ ∑ 2)2()(
1
 
We might select a model risk loathing function xy ln=  to take policy-maker's utility function. As 
simplified computation, here suppose policy-maker's wealth level is for 10000=w  rubles, therefore 
the expected utility of participating in the gambling is:  
∑∞
=
=
1
)()(
n
nn xpxuEU =
n
n
n p −
∞
=
×−+∑ 2)210000ln(
1
 
When n
n
n puu −
∞
=
×−+≤ ∑ 2)210000()10000(
1
 , namely 25.14≤p  
 policy-maker will choose “participating in the gambling”. 
That is, although this game's expectation repayment is infinite ,  the policy-maker is only willing to 
pay the minimum price to attend this game. If “participating in the gambling” is regarded as insurance 
product, policymakers with 10000 rubles is willing to pay 14.25 rubles to take out insurance at most. 
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3.  INSURANCE PRICING BETWEEN INSURERS 
 
In the reinsurance arrangement, stopping the loss reinsurance (LIU.2007). is the most superior. But in 
reinsurance practice, what needs to consider is not only the benefit original insurance company but the 
reinsurance company. In safe practice, to ensure the security, often two or more  insurance companies 
sign one risk agreement which is advantageous for both  through the negotiations , namely the two 
companies takes the original insurer and the reinsurance person's dual statuses appears at the same time. 
Supposes Insurance company A and Insurance company B has a chit respectively, random 
variable 1X  and 2X stand for their loss separately. And 
)(1 xF and )(2 xF  stand for the distribution function separately .Moreover, supposes initial reserve 
fund of company A and the company B respectively for 1w and 2w .For simplifing model, supposes the 
insurers only charge the insurance premium from the insured, namely 
∫∞= 0 11 )(xxdFp , ∫∞= 0 22 )(xxdFp .Insurance company A and the B utility function was standed 
for )(1 xu and )(2 xu separately. If both the two companys’ services have the indemnity with their 
amount respectively for 1x  and 2x .According to the contract provision, the amount which insurance 
company A will pay is ),( 21 xxy , Insurance company B pays the surplus 
indemnity ),( 2121 xxyxx −+ . Because these two company's benefit is opposite, therefore they have 
to carry on the negotiations in the function ),( 21 xxy ,  making the bilateral expected utility value as big 
as possible.In which, 
 ）（yU1 = )()()),(( 2121110 0 1 xFxdFxxypwu −+∫ ∫∞ ∞  
）（yU 2 = )()()),(( 212121220 0 2 xFxdFxxyxxpwu +−−+∫ ∫∞ ∞  
Obviously, both two companies are seeking to achieving the biggest effectiveness. According to the 
Pareto thought , the necessary and sufficient condition of optimal solution ),( 21 xxy is: 
)),(()),(( 212122
'
22111
'
1 xxyxxpwkuxxypwu +−−+=−+ in which 0≥k . ( )1  
 the proof for details sees (WANG Gang.2003). 
Only when the expected utility is bigger than do not cooperate ,can companies choose the 
cooperation. Namely:  
)()0( 11 yUU ≤   )()0( 22 yUU ≤  
From this we may obtain the value scope of ),( 21 xxy  which satisfies the condition  
Suppose the two insurance companies are known for the effectiveness of monetary : 
 xxaxu +−= 211 )(   xxaxu +−= 222 )(  
 by the type ( )1 , the necessary and sufficient condition of optimal solution  become:  
kxxyxxpwkaxxypwa −+−−+=−−+ )),((21)),((2 212122221111   
by the above equation, 
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Therefore, Qphhpxxhxxy +−−++−= 212121 )1())(1(),(  
 By the above equation, we can see that if in the company A has the amount for claim, then it only 
pays a corresponding round number, other parts are paid by company B. 
When the Insurance company A utility function is xxaxu +−= 211 )( , company's initial utility is  
∫∞ −+= 0 1111111 )()()0( xdFxpwuU = 11120 111211 )()( wxdFxpawa +−−− ∫∞  
Reorganized this type may write  
11
2
1
1
1
1
1 )2
1(
4
1)0( Vaw
a
a
a
U −−−=  in which ∫∞ −= 0 1211 )()( xdFpxV  
Similarly initial utility of company B is:  
∫∞ −+= 0 2222222 )()()0( xdFxpwuU = 2222
2
2
2
)
2
1(
4
1 Vaw
a
a
a
−−−  
in which ∫∞ −= 0 2222 )()( xdFpxV  
making 31 =w ， 42 =w ， 21 =V ， 32 =V ， 611 =a ， 612 =a  
then 6
726
1)33(62
3)0( 21 =×−−−=U  
6
536
1)43(62
3)0( 22 =×−−−=U  
[ ] 2221 )1(235)76()1(6123)( hhyU −−=+−−−=  
[ ] 2222 235)76(6123)( hhyU −=+−−=  
By )()0( 11 yUU ≤ and )()0( 22 yUU ≤ , we can see :  
3
6
3
31 ≤≤− h  
The Nash solution has gave the maximization of h : 
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[ ][ ])0()()0()( 2211 UyUUyUMax −−= = [ ][ ]22 32)1(31 hh −−−  
Solution: 613.0≈h ),( 21 xxy  
The optimal solution namely: 387.0-387.0613.0)(387.0),( 212121 ppxxxxy −++=  
So the most superior effectiveness of two company is:  
350231.1)(1 =yU   124231.1)(2 =yU  
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